[MUSIC] So I'm joined this afternoon in the gardens of the inner temple by Dr. Hannah Dawson of the New College of Humanities. A historian of ideas. And I'd like to ask you pretty straightforward question. What did Magna Carta mean? >> So, I suppose if one thinks about what Magna Carta means now, if it, if it means anything now, what it means is the principle of the rule of law. Which is obviously enshrined in that kind of central clause that says that a free man ought not to be imprisoned or otherwise ruined except by the judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. And I suppose it's worth kind of in, wondering why it is that that principle, the rule of law, has held the people's imagination for so many hundreds of years. And, it seems to me that the thing that is kind of essential about law is that it is fixed and predictable and publicly known, and can't change with the whim of the executive. And so what's crucial about law, the rule of law, is that it's the rule of law, something fixed in public, as opposed to the changeable will of, of an executive. >> So, so do you think almost embedded in that tradition is some sort of conflict between a monarchical form of government and this sort of legal rule of law. >> Well I think what's very interesting is that so what we have got. The significance that we have drawn from Magna Carta is this principle of the rule of law. But the funny irony is that that's kind of almost unrecognisable in the original document in the sense that the distinction between will and law is barely recognisable. In the sense that the law at the time and for several centuries afterwards was none other than the will of the king. And so to that extent the kind of thing that we adore about it, was not at all present at the start. And even of course, when it was revived by Coke in, in the 17th century. He saw, too, that he wasn't appealing to a, a fixed written law. But rather, the thing that he appealed to was the reason of the judges. And so, at all points, in a sense, of the history, what you have is a reliance upon human interpretation. And human will and human discretion, and actually the notion of a law looks throughout like a kind of chimera. >> Absolutely, so it's not the fixed moment in time that set everything in stone. >> Yes. >> It's. Yes. It's a tradition that needs to be reinvented in one sense. >> Yes, yes, that's right, and of course the other thing that's significant about the rule of law is that. And the reason that we, we adore it is that we, we think of it in a Democratic context. That's to say we think of the law as embodying the will of the people. So in so far as it's the law of the legislative which is made up of our representatives. It's an essential mechanism of self government, and thereby a freedom, but of course, that also is completely unpresent in the original document. Yeah. >> And I think that's one of the wonderful things that, you know, Cooke's reinvention in particular does. >> Yes. >> Taking that little wonderful phrase, the free man, the Liber Homo. >> Yes. >> 1215 there, there are probably about 200 of them. >> Yes. >> In 1615 there are many, many hundreds of thousands. So the historical context has changed the shape of the meaning of the words. >> That's right, that's right. And of course it might be worth saying that,. That, and this is in a way, to push back again against the sort of significance of the Magna Carta is to say that by the time that the language of the the liber homo, the free man, is being invoked in the 1640s. What is being drawn on there. Is both a kind of common law tradition and a Roman law tradition, which is folded into that. and, I mean, rather than see these as two kind of opposing traditions, I see them as kind of running in the same river. >> Hm. >> and, and testifying to the kind of central thought of the parliamentarian cause. Which is that in, unless you are ruled by your own will, that's to say by the will of your representatives in Parliament, then you are a slave. >> And it's one of those great moments isn't it, with Free Born John Lilburne. >> Yes. >> Who is citing Coke. >> Yes. >> On Magna Carta in this sort of images that he, you know, prefaces his pamphlets with. And you see that combination, the free born Englishman draws from this ancient tradition. >> Yes. >> But also from other sources. >> That's right. That's right and of course that's in a way Coke's point. That the Magna Carta is not as it were an introduction of this principle of the fundamental law, but rather it is just a reaffirmation, a declaration of something that goes back to time immemorial. and, and it is, it's, it draws on the natural law, it draws on the reason of men and, and to that extent is is an ancient constitution beyond memory. >> Is it the case though that Magna Carta is, is loved and beholden by all forms of radicals in the '40s and '50s. So there's no doubt that in the 1640s Magna Carta has sort of ossified, in the minds of many parliamentarians, as this sort of banner under which they can group, this banner which declares King, the King subject to law and accountable to Parliament. And there's no doubt that it's invoked on numerous occasions to that end. So for example, in the debates about ship money it's, it's invoked clearly there. And among the radicals they do draw on it. So for example, John Lilburne draws on, on the the clause about imprisonment. And they use it in, in their cause. But what's interesting is, there's a kind of inconsistency or an ambivalence within the kind of more radical wing of the opposition to the crown. And in some instances, actually, there's a kind of strong antipathy against it. So for example, Gerard Winstanley makes some very interesting objections to it. And one of the things he says that I think is really crucial, is, he says he reminds readers that it's a grant. It's a charter. And therefore it's not actually it's not actually laying down or testifying to certain rights that are inviolable. But rather, it is a grant of liberties that might be revoked at any point, and therefore they're not liberties at all. They are in fact privileges. They're not rights. And that's why you see him and his his kind of associates drawing on the far more radical language of natural rights and natural law and of a social contract. which, which yeah, testifies to a space of liberty that's inviolable. >> Absolutely. And I, I think you know, one of the areas where there is a radical shift. >> Yeah. >> Is probably just rhetorical. So, in particular, defending liberty of conscience. >> Yes. >> You get the phrase Magna Carta. >> Yes. >> Used repeatedly in, in the tiny little pamphlets produced by some of the sectarians who claim the privileges of Magna Carta mean my ten, tender conscience should be tolerated by anybody. >> That's right. >> And of course, most contemporaries regard this as madness. Yes. >> But the shift into the religious language is, is quite significant. >> Yes, yes. And of course, on that point, it's very important to note the extent to which this is, this is a document that is being invoked on the behalf of religious liberty, just as it's being invoked on behalf of civil liberty. But to go back to Winstanley, the other point that he makes against Magna Carta is the point that actually, in addition to this looking like a kind of charter that might be revoked at any point. He also makes the point that actually all the rights, the only liberties that it protects are the liberties of the rich. >> Yeah. >> The liberties of the property owners, it has it has no compassion for the poor, no sense of the common good, and to that extent it it kind of calls to mind the extent to which Magna Carta is an exclusive conservative document. I mean, obviously an an obvious omission as well that it makes is women. >> Absolutely.
