International approaches to regulating interchange have varied drastically. In Australia, for example, where the predecessor regulation to the Durbin amendment was implemented, Australian regulators chose to implement a percentage cap on credit interchange. Interestingly, note that Australia targeted credit and not debit interchange, and so a result of this intervention was a decreased proclivity of card issuers to have credit rewards and a decreased use of credit as a result of this intervention. This is quite different, of course, than Durbin where the incentive structure was set up for banks to actually increase the use of credit rewards and try and convince consumers to transact more with credit cards, which are traditionally thought of as a more dangerous payment instrument. Also, interesting in Australia again, because our legal structures are so different, surcharging became very common by Australian merchants in response to high interchange expense that they experienced, so much so that in recent years, Australian regulators have actually limited the ability of merchants to charge what they call excessive surcharges to consumers who decide to transact with credit instruments. Also, relatively recently in Australia, legislators have been focused on making sure that credit is only provided to consumers who are sufficiently able to repay these loans, which means a limitation on unsolicited credit offers and on the ability like the card act to change interest rates for consumers without providing them sufficient notice of planned changes. The approach to regulation in Europe and the UK around interchange has also been quite distinct from that of the US. Particularly, there has been a tremendous focus on creating a regulatory framework that's appropriate for the payment mechanisms. Specifically in Europe, there has been a push towards limiting the ability of card networks and card issuers to generate revenue from interchange, resulting in an interchange cap that's on the order of 0.2 or 0.3 percent for card transactions relative to interchange rates that are more like two or three percent in the US. It is quite interesting that the exact same card networks, like Visa and MasterCard, that tend to charge merchants for processing transactions in different countries, depending on where the merchant is situated, have an ability to do so that is dependent highly on the country in which the merchant operates, and particularly, their entire interchange structures that are deeply different in different kinds of regulatory regimes. With respect to China, the payment regulation has been much more opaque than it has in the rest of the world. The Chinese tend to be on the forefront of transaction with financial technologies replacing traditional payment structures like cash and check.