So in this lecture, I introduced you very briefly to some of the salient points of the debate between realism and anti-realism in science. To sum up, scientific realists believe that truth is the aim of science, and that we should believe our best theories and mature science to be true or at least approximately true. They appeal to the no miracles argument which says that if scientific theories were not true, if the unobservable entities that they postulate didn't exist, then it will be just a miracle that we have such a successful science. Next, we consider the prominent anti-realist response, namely constructive empiricism defended by the philosopher Bas van Fraassen. Under this account, science doesn't need to be true to be good. And the aim of science is simply to provide us with theories which are empirically adequate. We saw the rationale for this view, namely, how we build models that are adequate to the phenomena. And how we can make perfectly good sense of how science works without the additional metaphysical commitment to truth. Finally, we can see there's some realist rejoinders to constructive empiricism, and primarily inference to the best explanation as a way of delivering beliefs in unobservable entities, be they atoms, molecules, electrons, DNA strands. No less than in unobserved observables, such as dinosaurs and trilobites. Where does all this discussion leave us? Well, as always in philosophy, the debate goes on and an array of philosophical positions have been developed over the past 30 years that promise to overcome the standoff between realism and anti-realism. As our science grows and unfolds, so do our philosophical images of science. But this is a story for some other time, thank you.